INTRODUCTION
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in february 2022 was underpinned from the beginning by a reiterated 'nuclear sabre-rattling', by which the Kremlin vied to prevent any NATO (or West) interference with its 'special military operation'. It was a successful recourse to nuclear deterrence, achieving tangible strategic results: while multiplying their political and material support to Kyiv, NATO and the European Union have carefully avoided any step leading to a direct intervention in the conflict or providing Ukraine with strategic capabilities allowing it to hit targets deep in Russian territory. In spite of this immediate success, the blatant disregard of the 'nuclear taboo' -- and Article 2, number 4 the United Nations Charter-- have brought to the fore, again, the existential risk posed to humanity by the existence of nuclear weapons and the dire humanitarian consequences involved in any offensive use.
Vague references to possible use of so-called 'tactical' or 'theatre' nuclear weapons by Russia, triggered a lively debate on scenarios for their launching, the expected political and military advantages and the limitations of their impact in the front, plus the potential for escalation to a wider nuclear exchange with the United States and its nuclear allies. Such debates included a renewed appraisal of the dire humanitarian consequences of what would in fact be the only use of a nuclear device since august 1945. And a threat of use of nuclear weapons is, in a way, a use of them 1 .
In this gloomy political atmosphere, the multilateral system continued discharging its agenda, including the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): the first ended in failure, unable to adopt a consensus final document while the second provided renewed hope to those advocating for perseverance in the efforts leading to a world without nuclear weapons.
At a different scale the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues completed its work in may, 2023 with a consensus report (not a minor achievement given the global circumstances) but, even more importantly, the UN Secretary General embarked in a consultation/discussion process leading to the launching of a "New Agenda for Peace" including a 'new vision for disarmament'.
Such a process has the potential to galvanize the multilateral response to the reemergence of nuclear risks. The so-called Global South should actively engage in its implementation.
THE RETURN OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS USE: RUSSIA
The Russian aggression against Ukraine brought war back to Europe in a scale not seen since World War II. The magnitude of the military operations and the strategic odds involved --no less than the obliteration of a sovereign state universally recognized, a member of the United Nations-- was accompanied by Moscow's veiled but unmistakable threats to use nuclear weapons in case of interference with its euphemistically designated "special military operation". Vladimir Putin's words were invested with menacing, even bombastic overtones: whoever would try to stop us, and furthermore, create threats to our country, our people, should know that Russia's response will be immediate and lead you to such consequences as you have never faced in your history. We are ready for any situation that arises. All necessary decisions in this regard have been made... Later, on february 27, 2022 the Kremlin announced that Russian deterrence forces had been put in a special regime of combat duty 2 . In april 2022, following the failure of his offensive against Kyiv Mr. Putin insisted in the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if necessary . And after the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in the autumn, he further added that in case of a threat against Russian territorial integrity we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff 3 . On march 2023, President Putin announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, thus expanding the geographical theatre.
These threats --echoed by high officials in the Russian government, including former president Dmitri Medvedev, current vice-chair of the National Security Council-- have been denounced as "nuclear sabre-rattling" in the context of nuclear deterrence, Moscow's objective being to deter NATO from entering the conflict or providing the Ukraine with long-range or very advanced weapon systems (reaching targets deep into Russian territory)
Russia's nuclear signalling appears to have been mainly intended to deter the United States and NATO from intervening directly with military forces in Ukraine to prevent a wider war. However, this has triggered widespread international fears about the extent to which this invasion could have significant implications for the global nuclear order. In the words of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, "the prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility" 4 .
According to several sources, this deterrence succeeded. But the West's nuclear arsenals have also limited the scope and reach of Russian aggression:
(...) nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine are not remarkable in their absence, [but rather in how they frame the conflict]{.underline}. By deterring the greater intervention of NATO, the Russian nuclear arsenal has helped prolong the war and make any conventional resolution to the fighting more difficult to attain. The conflict in Ukraine is no doubt the most dangerous nuclear confrontation since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the past year of carnage and bluster has shown, nuclear weapons wield devastating power [even as they remain locked in their silos]{.underline} (...) In the context of the Ukraine war, nuclear weapons have mostly benefited Russia. Putin has invoked his nuclear might to deter NATO from any military intervention on Ukraine's behalf. [That deterrence has worked]{.underline}: the West is (rationally) unwilling to enter the war directly or even to give Ukraine long-range firepower that could reach far into Russia, for fear that such help could end up sparking an apocalyptic nuclear conflict 5 .(...) To be sure, the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of several NATO member states presumably have deterred Russia from expanding the war to NATO countries, such as Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states. In this regard, [nuclear deterrence has clearly helped prevent a wider war]{.underline} 6 . (Our underlining).
But Russian deterrence success has been only partial: the continued Russian operational setbacks and the unexpected exploits of the Ukrainian forces along 2022 reaffirmed the West's support for Kyiv, manifested in a sustained flow of military and financial assistance, with the provision of a vast array of increasingly high-tech weapon systems, including air defence missile systems, medium range artillery rockets and missiles, armoured vehicles, self-propelled howitzers and battle-tanks, plus ever growing numbers of artillery ammunition, missiles and rockets. At the moment of this writing, Ukrainian crews are being trained to pilot F-16 fighters transferred by NATO members. These proven multirole aircrafts are expected to tilt the balance yet again in Ukrainian advantage in the coming months.
The spectre of nuclear use generated a flurry of analysis on non-strategic or "tactical" nuclear warheads and their likely impact in military operations, on the presumed Russian doctrine governing their use and the risks of escalation into a wider nuclear confrontation with NATO. Also, the deterioration of the "nuclear taboo" and the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use.
An important political casualty of Russian nuclear hubris has been the nuclear disarmament and arms control regime. In february 2023, President Putin announced the suspension of Russian participation in the verification mechanisms of the New START Treaty, the last bilateral instrument regulating U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. And in October 2023, the Russian Duma opened the legislative way for the Kremlin to revoke the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which represents the most serious challenge to this important disarmament convention and increases the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race, including testing.
Such developments confirmed the negative trends we analysed in some detail in our article last year. The vertical proliferation process implied in the nuclear modernisation and expansion programmes from the five Nuclear Weapon States recognised by the NPT 7 is compounded by the "nuclear temptation" haunting not just obvious proliferators-to-be such as Iran but also well-established nuclear disarmament advocates including South Korea and Japan 8 .
A new era of nuclear military competition would bring the world back to the dangerous times of the Cold War and compromise global and regional stability.
The illusion of "limited" use
A significant element in the nuclear discussion unfolding even years before the Russian invasion is the idea that limited-yield nuclear warheads --the non-strategic or "tactical" weapons-- could be used to underpin deterrence or change the course of military operations. The United States in particular, badly needs to redevelop such tactical capabilities after years of neglect 9 . Russia never gave up its tactical nukes and enjoys today a solid advantage in numbers over NATO 10 . Numbers of Russian tactical weapons have been estimated around 2.000, but the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists adjusts the real numbers to 1.816 11 . By comparison, the United States deploys just about 200 nonstrategic nuclear warheads: basically, the B61 gravity bomb, fitted to particularly designed U.S. and NATO fighters 12 .
The resulting asymmetries (including in doctrine) enable Russia to seriously contemplate first nuclear use with the expectation that NATO will capitulate to Russian demands rather than retaliate in kind. To the extent that Russia's assessment of NATO's response is correct, the future efficacy of deterrence would be seriously -perhaps fatally- undermined. On the other hand, an incorrect Russian assessment poses the risk of unexpected and uncontrolled nuclear escalation 13 .
Discussion around Russian nuclear doctrine, nuclear command and control and "redlines" is therefore indispensable.
The role of nuclear weapons in Russian doctrine, last updated in 2020 14 , defines precise conditions for the use of nuclear weapons; these are contained in paragraphs 4, 17 and 19 of Presidential Order (Decree) 355 of 2 june 2020:
4. The state policy in the area of nuclear deterrence is of a defensive nature, aimed at maintaining the potential of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence, and [guarantees the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state]{.underline}, deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and in the event of an outbreak of a military conflict---the preclusion of the escalation of military actions and [their cessation on conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation]{.underline} and (or) its allies. (Our underlining)17. The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the [event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy]{.underline}. (Our underlining)19. The conditions that make it possible that Russia will employ nuclear weapons include: (a) the receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies; (b) the use by an adversary of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies; (c) adversary actions affecting critically important state or military objects of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which could lead to the disruption of retaliatory actions by nuclear forces; (d) [aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of state is in jeopardy]{.underline} 15 . (Our underlining)
Reputed analysts indicate that there were no major differences between this normative statement and previous doctrinal incarnations (2014, 2010 and 2000) 16 , which demonstrates a remarkable consistency in Russian nuclear policy. Moreover, as explained by Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), Russian deterrence strategy rests on classic foundations, but Presidential Order 355 contains further clarifications, and greater clarity helps enhance deterrence 17 .
Russian nuclear deterrence strategy rests on classic foundations dating back to Paul Nitze and Thomas Schelling . If any elements may appear insufficiently clear, sources to resolve these are readily available: one does not have to look beyond Schelling.That said, the decree is welcome: many important points in Russian policy needed clarification. The debate in the West, especially in the United States, about the conditions under which Russia might use its nuclear weapons and, more generally, the foundations of Russian deterrence policy, has been raging for a long time and especially for the last three years. At the heart of that debate was the question whether Russia had an "escalate-to-deescalate" policy, i.e. limited nuclear use in the midst of a conventional conflict 18 .
The "escalation" element in the formula would consist in a limited ("tactical") nuclear strike, to bluntly impress on an adversary (the U.S., NATO and Kyiv) Russia's determination to prevail, hence forcing an end to the conflict in terms favourable or at least acceptable to the Kremlin (such termination of the conflict represents the "de-escalation" part). "Escalation" would be used in case of a hurting stalemate, invasion of Russian territory or imminent conventional defeat ("when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy"). In such speculative hypothesis Routed (Russian) troops would fire a nuclear weapon to stun an aggressor into retreat or submission. Moscow repeatedly practiced the tactic in field exercises. In 1999, for instance, a large drill simulated a NATO attack on Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea. The exercise had Russian forces in disarray until Moscow fired nuclear arms at Poland and the United States 19 .
Although there is currently no credible threat to the Russian state's political independence (sovereignty) or territorial integrity --in the sense of Article 2, number 4 de the United Nations Charter-- from the Kremlin's perspective, such scenario would apply to territories illegally annexed by Russia along its protracted aggression against Ukraine and, particularly, to Crimea 20 . Losing the Crimean Peninsula which since Catherine the Great harbours the Russian Black Sea Fleet would pose an unacceptable political risk for President Putin 21 . Additionally, President Putin's understanding of "sovereignty" could be related to his regime's stability, in the line of North Korea or Iran, for whose leaders, regime survival is the main security interest, thus justifying their nuclear programmes 22 .
Another --tricky-- area of interpretation deals with the notion of "the very existence of the state (being put) in jeopardy". The assessment of such existential threat would fall upon the current Russian leadership and there would a natural tendency to equate state survival with regime survival.
(In paragraph 4 of the Presidential Decree (t)he state and society are not conflated meaning that a threat to the state's control of Russia potentially meets the Russian criterion [even if Russian society is not under catastrophic attack]{.underline}. There is also a semantic question; does the clause refer to the use of conventional weapons on a scale that could destroy the Russian's state effective functionality or does it refer to the use of conventional weapons at any scale in a political context [where Russian leaders believe]{.underline} the existence of the state is imperilled? 23 . (Our underlining).Following the 2010 and the 2014 Military Doctrines, the decree posits that nuclear weapons would be used in response to an aggression "which puts the very existence of the Russian Federation under threat" (paragraph 17). Paragraph 4, however, talks about "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the Russian Federation, which is closer to the language that was contained in the 2000 Military Doctrine and allowed for nuclear use "in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies." (...) Today (2020), it is also easy to imagine a situation when the "existence" of Russia would not be threatened, but its "territorial integrity" would---for example, an attempt to use force to return Crimea to Ukraine 24 .
Finding an answer to the question concerning the doctrine of "escalate-to-deescalate" from the terms of the 2020 Presidential Decree, Dr. Sokov concludes that on the surface, the answer is a resounding "yes". The entire purpose of nuclear deterrence as defined in Paragraph 4 is to "prevent escalation of a conflict and its termination on conditions acceptable to Russia and/or its allies." Which means, in plain language, that if Russia faces a major defeat, it will resort to nuclear weapons so that the attacker ends the aggression and returns to status quo ante or perhaps somewhat better for Russia 25 .
Confirming that Russian nuclear doctrine contemplates first nuclear use 26 under the terms defined by the latest iteration of its nuclear doctrine, the questions about whether and how President Putin would resort to actual use of tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea and the possible consequences of such an extreme decision opened another analytical stream. Observers addressed even the Russian President's psychology, his alleged fundamentalism and ideological sources of inspiration 27 . Psychological factors ought to be considered in the context of deterrence, which takes place in the minds of nuclear adversaries. For example, the application of the doctrinal clause providing for nuclear weapons use in case of an existential threat to the Russian state will be preceded by a cognitive and decisional process occurring in the Russian leadership minds 28 . Such line of analysis falls beyond the scope of the present article but needs to be taken into consideration, not only in the context of the current Russian aggression against Ukraine, but in general, as a problematic variable in nuclear deterrence.
A new Russian nuclear "normal"; a nuclear church
A worrisome development taking place in Russia is a "normalisation" of the nuclear discourse in the media, academic circles (particularly military publications) and even public opinion. This is a consequence of the reiterated nuclear "sabre-rattling" from the Kremlin but would also emerge from deeply seated ideas in the collective mentality. Professor Dmitry Adamsky, from the Reichman University in Tel Aviv, deals in depth with this problem in an enlightening article published by Foreign Affairs last may. In his view the war --which had a nuclear component from the start -- further nuclearized the Russian establishment's strategic thought and normalized nuclear weapons in the public's consciousness. (...) As a result, the Russian public appears to have become more comfortable with the idea of using atomic weapons 29 . At the level of public opinion nuclear weapons have become a popular topic of conversation. (...) The notion that using nuclear weapons should be a last resort but not an unthinkable option has become routine in Russian media and has framed common thinking about escalation in war (...) the bellicose environment has radicalized much of the population 30 . The role of Russian (official) media in this radicalisation had been pointed out by Tatiana Stanovaya, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in October, 2022 31 .
Concerning the Russian military establishment, Professor Adamsky draws attention to an unprecedented number of articles published in the journal of the general staff portraying a supposed Washington's ploy to 'de-militarize' and 'de-sovereign' Russia and then exploit the countries 'territorial, natural, industrial and human resources' 32 Such imagined objectives --posing an existential threat to the Russian state-- would be achieved after a U.S. 'prompt global strike' decapitating the Russian military's supreme command and nullifying its nuclear retaliation capacity 33 . Consequently, these freakish scenarios lead to demands for further nuclear modernization and expansion, in order to reaffirm the credibility of the Russian nuclear deterrence 34 .
A disturbing factor signalled by Professor Adamsky and other observers is the role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in this process of radicalisation 35 . After years of consistent and faithful political support, the Russian national church and its Patriarch Kirill are very much a part of the regime, now supporting the aggression against Ukraine: Russia is fighting the forces of evil and Satan, as illustrated by statements about the 'special military operation' as a 'war of the army of Archangel Michael against the devil' and the need to 'de-satanize' Ukraine 36 . Such endorsement has reached nuclear weapons themselves: Patriarch Kirill recently honoured the director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre, based in the premises of the old Sarov monastery, where the Soviet Union's nuclear military programme developed. In his speech the Patriarch asserted that were it not for the work of (the Soviet scientists which developed the Russian atomic bomb) it is difficult to say if our country would still exist , adding that those scientists created weapons under the protection of St. Seraphim of Sarov, because, [by the ineffable providence of God]{.underline}, these weapons were created in the monastery of St. Seraphim 37 .
(...) the messianic-existential aura that the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church have given to the war has also contributed to nuclear normalization. Both institutions are framing the conflict in almost transcendental terms---as a clash of civilizations and a civil war within the "Russian world." The Kremlin and the church present Ukraine as a "prodigal daughter" that has become a proxy for the forces of darkness, specifically a collective West that is seeking to dismantle Russia spiritually and geopolitically. In their wartime speeches, both Putin and Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, have embraced the language of martyrdom, of purifying sacrifice, and of repentance---all for the sake of winning the war. This language is most obviously applicable to Russian soldiers, many of whom face death on the battlefield, and many of whom are blessed by priests before being deployed. But the rhetoric [may also prime Russians at home to accept the highest possible costs as necessary in this clash of civilizations]{.underline} 38 . (Our underlining)
The normalisation of the nuclear use discourse has reached popular culture (as usually promoted by the propaganda of totalitarian regimes): a popular Russian rock singer, close to the Kremlin (...) produced a hymn to Sarmat -the country's newest class of intercontinental ballistic missiles 39 (...) A videoclip of the song (accompanied by a uniformed military orchestra) highlights Putin's eschatological figures of speech in relation to nuclear weapons and the fate of the world, threatens the United States and NATO, and concludes with the words: [God and Sarmat are with us]{.underline} 40 . The music video for the song, titled "Sarmatushka," was uploaded to YouTube on december 17, 2022 by ParkPatriot.Media, the propaganda arm of the Ministry of Defence. The video is available, at the time of this writing, in YouTube at this link (8932) Сарматушки (Sarmatushka) - YouTube.
The nuclear discourse has reached such levels of intensity that reputed voices have openly advocated for pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against NATO countries. Sergei A. Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, a high-ranking political Russian think tank, called for nuclear strikes on Western Europe to re-establish nuclear deterrence and finish the conflict according to Russian terms: The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a pre-emptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war. Karaganov is confident that if we (Russia) *[correctly]{.underline} build a strategy of intimidation and deterrence and even use of nuclear weapons, the risk of a "retaliatory" nuclear or any other strike on our territory can be reduced to an absolute minimum * 41 * . * He doesn't elaborate on such "correct" strategy.
Understandably, Karaganov's "controversial essay" (as depicted by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 ) generated not only controversy but serious alarm in Russia. A group of 24 members of the think tank published a statement in the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy website on 13 july, 2023, found in this link CALLS FOR NUCLEAR WAR - Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (svop.ru) which in my opinion testifies to the high-mindedness of -at least- a segment of the Russian intelligentsia.
Recently, there have been speeches and statements, including by a number of SVOP members, in which, albeit with numerous reservations, the idea of Russia launching a preventive nuclear strike (...) in Ukraine (has been promoted). Moreover, the authors do not limit themselves to the flight of fantasy about the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, [but also propose to hit (...) NATO countries]{.underline}.(...) To hope that a limited nuclear conflict can be managed and prevented from escalating into a global nuclear war is the height of irresponsibility. This means that the destruction of tens and perhaps even hundreds of millions of people in Russia, Europe, China, the United States and other countries is at stake. [This is a direct threat to humanity in general]{.underline}.[It is unacceptable to use pseudo-theoretical arguments and emotional statements in the style of the so-called "talk shows" to form such moods in society that can push them to make catastrophic decisions.]{.underline} These are no longer theoretical concepts. This is not only a direct threat to all of humanity, but also a very concrete proposal to kill everyone we care about and love.We, the members of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, consider such proposals absolutely unacceptable and unequivocally condemn them.(Our underlining. We incorporate the full text of the Statement as an Annex to this article).
Nuclear deterrence --and indirectly nuclear use-- were addressed last October, at the Valdai International Discussion Club (a debate conference associated with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy) with the presence of President Vladimir Putin 43 . There, Dr. Karaganov posited again (through a question) that Russian doctrine on using nuclear weapons had become obsolete. Deterrence does not work anymore. (It is) high time we modify the doctrine, lowering the nuclear threshold and moving steadily (...), quickly along the stair of escalation.
President Putin acknowledged Karaganov's point of view ( I know your position (...) and I understand your feelings). Then he recalled the two scenarios (defined in the 2020 Presidential Decree) for the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia . The first is the use of nuclear weapons against us, which would entail a so-called retaliatory strike. In this first scenario, the Russian counterstrike would involve hundreds -hundreds of our missiles in the air, so that [no enemy will have a chance to survive]{.underline}. And (we can respond) in [several directions at once]{.underline}. The second scenario for the potential use of this weapons is an existential threat to the Russian state -even if conventional weapons are used against Russia, but the very existence of Russia as a state is threatened.
(...) Do we need to change this? Why would we? Everything can be changed, but I just don't see that we need to. [There is no situation imaginable today]{.underline} where something would threaten Russian statehood and the existence of the Russian state. I do not think anyone in their right mind would consider using nuclear weapons against Russia. (...) I do not see the need to change our (doctrine). The potential adversary knows everything and [is aware of what we are capable of]{.underline}. (Our underlining).
Apparently then, the Russian doctrinal debate has subsided; but the pressure remains.
Doctrinal discussions aside, the question of the military value of tactical nuclear weapons is open. Some analysts recall that a key lesson from the Cold War was their lack of utility. For example, US Army studies concluded that a 1 kiloton 44 warhead would need to detonate within 90 metres of a tank to inflict serious damage. This conclusion has been reinforced by academic studies on the potential uses of tactical nuclear weapons in the context of an Indo-Pakistani war, which suggest a 5 kiloton Pakistani weapon used against an Indian armoured regiment could knock out 13 tanks 45 . David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, writing in the New York Times affirmed that For all its threats to fire tactical nuclear weapons at Ukrainian targets, President (...) Putin is now discovering what the United States itself concluded years ago (...) Small nuclear weapons are hard to use, hard to control and a far better weapon of terror and intimidation than a weapon of war 46 . We have no space to delve into a very technical matter but, from a humanitarian point of view there is no doubt that any nuclear detonation --irrespective of the number of military casualties and damage it inflicts-- would have lasting negative effects on the environment beyond the battle theatre, impacting civilians at both sides of the battle lines. Such consequences are inherent in the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons.
Our impression is that President Putin government's actions regarding nuclear deterrence or use of tactical nuclear weapons will not be guided or determined by international law or doctrinal considerations, but by the unfolding of a conflict which, at the time of this writing descends more and more into a war of attrition with similarities to be found in the First World War.
Unfortunately, Russian sabre-rattling has brought back nuclear weapons and all their associated doctrinal paraphernalia to the centre of the security stage in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. NATO countries --and overseas allies-- are now more inclined to value nuclear deterrence and even to prepare for nuclear scenarios after the war in Ukraine 47 . Kremlin's hubris and irresponsible behaviour have moved the world into a dangerous quagmire.
The last manifestation of such behaviour has been Russia's revocation of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is an important pillar of the nuclear-disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, proscribing explosive nuclear testing and thus inhibiting further progress of nuclear-weapons technology. While the CTBT has not entered into force 48 it musters 187 States signatories and 177 States Parties. The Treaty is a particular case of instrument fulfilling its main purposes while remaining not-in-force. The International Monitoring System (IMS, the verification mechanism of the Treaty) deploys 337 facilities worldwide of which 321 are monitoring stations 49 intended to detect (and deter) nuclear explosive tests, its efficacy demonstrated by its prompt detection of all (six) North Korean nuclear tests. The Kremlin has indicated that Russia intends to keep complying with the Treaty provisions, including through the 32 IMS monitoring stations in its territory 50 . However, as warned by Hugh Chalmers, from VERTIC,
The withdrawal of Russia's ratification has cast a shadow over the CTBT. In this shadow, ambiguities and uncertainties in the interpretation and observation of treaty restrictions can grow into mistrust -- taking State Signatories further from ratification and closer to a return to nuclear testing. Nuclear-armed Signatories should seek to understand how they each interpret testing restrictions and demonstrate how their nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship activities abide by those restrictions. The US has invited international observers to its nuclear testing site to explore options for confidence-building measures, and has proposed to work with others to develop a reciprocal regime in this regard. This is a welcome step towards transparency and confidence-building, and should be supported.
Russia's claim that its withdrawal of ratification responds to the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty 51 is a lame argument: in spite of the --domestic politics-- fact that five successive Administrations have been unable (or unwilling) to shepherd the Senate's two thirds majority needed to pass the ratification, Washington has remained a loyal, consistent and active partner in the CTBT community, contributing substantially to the Organisation's budget. Other reasons, no doubt connected to the Ukrainian conflict, may hold more water. Thong Zao, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace posits that:
Putin repeatedly seeks to [manipulate the risks of a nuclear escalation]{.underline} of the Ukraine war to achieve broader coercive goals, such as the containment of US and NATO military aid to Ukraine. Against this background, the de-ratification (...) represent(s) another step of escalation and move Russia one step closer toward conducting a nuclear explosion, [either in the form of a nuclear test]{.underline} or actual nuclear use. Russia's actions contribute to normalizing the practice of nuclear coercion and erode global confidence in the existing moratorium on nuclear testing among nuclear weapons states. Its negative impact on the policies of other nuclear-armed states should not be underestimated 52 . (Our underlining)
A resumption of explosive testing by nuclear-weapon possessor States would be a major political setback to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation order: the international community must remain attentive to prevent it.
THE MULTILATERAL FRONT
The Non-proliferation Treaty
Contrary to some expectations 53 , the postponements of the X Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened at last in New York in august 2022 (it should have taken place in 2020), did not save the exercise from the fate of its 2015 predecessor. States Parties were not able to adopt a final document, this time due to Russian opposition. Russia blocked the last text circulated by the President --which according to sources had reached preliminary consensus-- objecting its wording on the military occupation of the largest nuclear plant in Europe, Zaporizhzhia, during its invasion of Ukraine 54 . While such kind of development is expected in disarmament fora due to their adherence to the strictest understanding of the rule of consensus 55 , two failed Review Conferences in a row convey a negative political outlook for an instrument widely regarded as the corner stone of the nuclear order.
Prior to the X Review Conference's inception there was little optimism about the real prospects of reaching consensus, due to the unfavourable political atmosphere generated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, a somewhat "watered-down" outcome text had been circulated on august 25 (document NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.1) which, bar the Russian opposition, would have allowed the Treaty community to offer a measure of unity 56 .
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
In stark contrast, the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, convening for just three days in Vienna in june 2022, was a resounding success.
The Treaty entered into force in january 2022 and at the moment of this writing comprises 93 signatories and 69 parties. The First Meeting was attended by 34 observers States 57 and was enriched by a substantial contribution from 85 civil society organisations, which since the negotiations leading to the diplomatic conference of january and july 2017 have been a vital partner in the Treaty "community" (very much in the vein and style of the Ottawa Convention, banning antipersonnel landmines). The most salient among these is the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, ICAN, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 precisely for its role in the multilateral efforts leading to the successful adoption of the TPNW.
Nuclear weapon possessing sates 58 did not attend. Japan was not present officially, but survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the respected "hibakusha", whose advocacy enjoys unquestionable moral weight, the mayors of both cities and NGOs served as ambassadors for the first and, so far, only nation victim of a nuclear attack; their presence and interventions were dutifully followed and amplified by Japanese media reporters.
The UN Secretary General and Pope Francis addressed the conference, reinforcing its moral impact.
Before the Meeting, Austria hosted yet another Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons. Three similar conferences in 2013 and 2014, in Oslo, Nayarit (México) and Vienna provided scientific and political support to a multilateral enterprise predicated on the urgent need to prevent the horrific humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. This approach remains an essential political and moral driver at a global juncture where the "nuclear taboo" seems to be eroding amidst nuclear sabre-rattling, the "nuclear temptation" 59 , the return to deterrence doctrines and voices positing the military value of non-strategic nuclear warheads. The second Vienna conference took notice of new scientific research reaffirming previous conclusions regarding the devastating humanitarian consequences due to detonation, radioactive fallout and wide-scale environmental damage.
The Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria and the University of York have published last july an excellent volume, containing an overview of the most recent scholarship about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and their related risks. Of special significance is the body of research on the environmental impact of even a "limited" nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with effects spanning the whole world, a devastating "nuclear winter" 60 .
The First Meeting of States Parties adopted a political statement (the Vienna Declaration), a Plan of Action and four decisions related to Article 4 of the TPNW, the creation of a Scientific Advisory Group, the complementarity of the Treaty with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament regime and the intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty 61 .
The Vienna Declaration salutes the entry into force of the TPNW, which is now a consolidated instrument of International Law, formulating the prohibition of nuclear weapons in legal terms and thus embodying the aspirations of a clear majority in the United Nations membership. Furthermore, this instrument has the capacity to evolve into international customary law applicable, eventually, erga omnes :
We celebrate the entry into force of the Treaty on 22 january 2021. Nuclear weapons are now explicitly and comprehensively prohibited by international law, [as has long been the case for biological and chemical weapons]{.underline}. We welcome that the Treaty [fills this gap in the international legal regime against weapons of mass destruction]{.underline} and reaffirm the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law 62 . (Our underlining).That the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well-being and are [incompatible with respect for the right to life]{.underline}. They inflict destruction, death and displacement, as well as profound long-term damage to the environment, socioeconomic and sustainable development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, including with regard to the disproportionate impacts they have on women and girls 63 . (Our underlining).
This paragraph is relevant to underpin the intimate connection of the Treaty with both International Humanitarian Law and International Law of Human Rights. As we have signalled in a previous article 64 , this is the first disarmament treaty to include explicit references to gender. Such considerations are strategically important to develop a narrative aimed at the world's public opinion. The alliance with civil society is embedded in the text and practice of the Treaty and its political success will depend on the capacity to create a wider base of public support, similar to the one elicited by climate change instruments. The cause of nuclear disarmament will be fought in minds and hearts as well as in streets and conference rooms.
From this perspective, Articles 6, dealing with assistance to victims of use and testing of nuclear weapons, and 7, providing for environmental remediation where nuclear testing took place do create opportunities for dissemination and public support-building. Actions 19 to 32 in the Vienna Action Plan 65 seek to engage relevant stakeholders, including States that tested nuclear weapons and create institutional and legal tools to channel international cooperation and assistance to affected States. All these to implement the victim's assistance and environmental remediation measures envisaged by the Treaty. The Action Plan also contemplates mobilising the United Nations system and relevant humanitarian international organisations and NGOs to create an implementation framework. Most importantly, Action 29 opens a discussion on the establishment of an international trust fund for affected States. The purpose of such fund would be, inter alia, to provide aid to assist survivors and to support measures toward environmental remediation.
These ideas no doubt inspired a cross-cutting group of UN member states: Austria, Chile, Fiji, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, New Zealand and the Philippines 66 , to introduce the first General Assembly's draft Resolution on victims' assistance and environmental remediation, at its First Committee's 78^th^ session, this year. The group of original co-sponsors include two States still suffering from the environmental consequences of past nuclear testing: Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union performed 456 nuclear tests (at the Semipalatinsk testing ground) from 1946 to 1989; and Kiribati, a small insular republic in Oceania where the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 33 nuclear detonations between 1957 and 1962.
The sixteenth preambular paragraph of the Draft Resolution ensures the association with both the TPNW and the Vienna Action Plan with a direct reference:
Noting the humanitarian provisions on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on 21 january 2021, [and the references to these humanitarian provisions contained in the Vienna Action Plan]{.underline}, adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 june 2022, (Our underlining).
The Draft Resolution, A/C.1/78/L. 52 67 was adopted on november 3, by an overwhelming majority of 171 votes in favour with only four "no" votes (France, DPRK, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom) and six abstentions (China, Congo, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United States). It is a substantive Resolution encouraging international cooperation on the subject matter but also urging States, which have used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices , to participate in victim's assistance and environmental remediation, providing technical and scientific information regarding the humanitarian and environmental consequences of such use and testing with Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices. The text enters the politically tricky field of accountability by recognizing that the responsibility to address the harms resulting from a detonation of using or testing a nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device lies, respectively, with the Member States that have done so 68 .
The draft Resolution also calls upon Member States to contribute technical and financial assistance and calls upon Member States, in a position to do so, to proportionate technical and financial assistance, as appropriate. Finally, the Resolution included the subject matter in the provisional agenda for the General Assembly's 79^th^ session (2024-2025). No wonder, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists called the Resolution "a small victory for nuclear justice" 69 .
Russia. The Vienna Declaration dealt with the Russian nuclear threats in oblique fashion. Moscow's friends blocked European efforts to name the Kremlin's aggression in the clear terms drafted by the United Nation General Assembly in their pertinent Resolutions 70 . However, the violation of the UN Charter involved in any threat or use of nuclear weapons is manifestly consigned.
4. We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances 71 .
Universalisation of the Treaty will be one the major goals of its state parties. The TPNW community has framed this objective not just in terms of enlarged membership --while increasing the number of ratifications and accessions is an immediate challenge--. In a deeper sense, universalisation is understood as a communication offensive reaching key actors in society and the public opinion at large. This narrative-motivated conception works in close synergy with the larger political aim of delegitimising nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence 72 .
This is an ideological/doctrinal confrontation acquiring urgent salience when the sudden return of war to Europe fuels security demands leading to arms race and increased nuclear readiness, based on the premises of nuclear deterrence 73 . In my view such strong delegitimising potential explains --at least in part-- the militant opposition to the Treaty displayed by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 74 .
Nuclear Weapon States have engaged in active obstruction of the ban Treaty entry into force process 75 purporting, among other arguments, its incompatibility with the NPT. From their perspective, the TPNW erodes the NPT, by generating a legal alternative that weakens the latter. When the TPNW's travaux préparatoires are edited and published, the intention of the negotiators to avoid such scenario will be crystal clear. The eighteenth preambular paragraph of the ban Treaty states, to the letter: Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in the promotion of international peace and security . Such straightforward recognition of the NPT as a "cornerstone" of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its role in the preservation of international peace and security --a global public good-- constitutes a quasi-liturgical use of agreed language to acknowledge an almost universally accepted principle 76 , a principle the Vienna Declaration promptly confirmed:
12. (...) We recognize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and deplore threats or actions that risk undermining it. As [fully committed States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty]{.underline} 77 , we reaffirm the complementarity of the Treaty with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are pleased to have advanced the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, as a necessary and effective measure related to the cessation of the nuclear a rms race and to nuclear disarmament. (...) We reiterate our commitment to work constructively with [all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve our shared objectives]{.underline} 78 . (Our underlining).
The TPNW is a political rally point for the vast majority of the United Nations member states, mostly in the South, confronted by weapons whose mere existence endangers humanity. Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, President of the First Meeting, portrays its potential with eloquent words: While it cannot coerce anyone to give up its nuclear weapons, the treaty can provide a convincing rationale for the lack of legitimacy, legality, and sustainability of nuclear weapons through strong arguments and evidence. When most nuclear developments point in the opposite direction of nuclear disarmament (...) the TPNW is an indispensable and potentially consequential ray of hope... 79
The Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues (GGENDV)
At a different multilateral scale, this Group of Governmental Experts provided another rare case of adoption by consensus of a substantive outcome document in a far-from-auspicious political environment.
In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly, forging ahead in the management of disarmament matters, created a Group of (25) Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, (aiming at) the development and strengthening of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures and on the importance of such measures in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons 80 . The Group, first established by Resolution A/RES/71/67 adopted on 5 december 2016, was renewed with an expanded mandate in 2019 81 .
Through Resolution 74/50 the General Assembly ratified its authority on peace and security matters 82 commending *the pioneering nature of the work of the (first) Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, as this represents the first time that the General Assembly established a body specifically to discuss nuclear disarmament verification (sixth preambular paragraph [PP], emphasis added). This assertion, in my view, underpins the right of all UN member States to participate in nuclear disarmament discussions, a notion reinforced by the seventh PP, explaining that a credible multilateral verification regime in which all States have confidence will also be essential for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons* 83 .
Due to the pandemic, the (second) GGE had to postpone its four sessions (originally programmed for 2021 and 2022) for one year, opening in Geneva on february 21, 2022, three days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its mandate consisted in further consideration of nuclear disarmament verification issues , (...) building on the report 84 of the (first) Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the views of Member States .
Experts from seven nuclear weapon States: China, France, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States were represented in GGE. Also, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sweden and South Africa. After being proposed by Chile, the author was designated by the UN Secretary General as one of the 25 members of both Groups of Experts. Our region was represented by experts from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico 85 .
Given the timing and political circumstances, the Group faced a significant challenge. Its rules of procedure prescribed decision-making by consensus, which meant its outcome could be blocked by a single expert. The professionalism and integrity of each and every member of the Group permitted us to preserve an atmosphere of respect and cooperation throughout the four sessions, under the proactive, prudent and wise chairmanship of Jorn Osmundsen, from Norway. Differences --predictable, considering the participation of representatives from Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Western and Non-Aligned nations-- were examined and common ground was found in spite of doctrinal and operational divergences. These were not minor ones: the Russian Federation, for instance, consistently maintained (in both incarnations of the GGE) that verification regimes are dependent to specific disarmament or arms control instruments. Therefore, nuclear disarmament verification cannot be discussed in a legal vacuum (Russia cast the single negative vote to Resolution 74/50).
In the fourth session (last may) the draft Report was discussed and finally adopted 86 , after several and intensive consultations intended to allay divergences. The result was neither perfect nor completely satisfactory to everyone, but the GGE remained united and, most importantly, was able to fulfil its mandate, thus legitimizing and contributing to future discussion of nuclear disarmament issues under the aegis of the General Assembly 87 .
THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE
Last july, within the omni comprehensive conceptual, political and operational context of the Summit for the Future 88 , programmed to take place in New York in september 2024, the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, launched "A New Agenda for Peace" (NAP) 89 . This initiative informs -from an action-oriented perspective- one of five chapters of the envisaged "Pact of the Future", to be adopted by the General Assembly next september.
The NAP was formulated after an intensive process of consultations with UN member States, intergovernmental institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, academia (including reputed think-tanks such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[SIPRI]) and civil society organisations, taking place in New York, Geneva and Vienna (the main UN "capitals") 90 .
Some history and basic concepts. The NAP pertains to peace and security, one the three pillars sustaining the work of the United Nations. The concept and nature of such pillars is one of the contributions of the 2005 UN World Summit, that set in motion yet another effort to adapt the Organisation to better respond to new challenges. The outcome document of the Summit, contained in Resolution A/60/1, states in paragraph 9: We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the [foundations for collective security and well-being]{.underline}. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are [interlinked and mutually reinforcing]{.underline}. (Our underlining) 91 . This formulation sought to resolve the false tension between the main UN objectives (purposes, in the words of the Charter 92 ) and the sometimes-conflicting approaches and courses of action taken by political groupings within the membership to address, prioritise (and therefore, fund) projects, programmes and their resulting mandates.
Since decolonisation enlarged the UN membership in the 50' and 60', increasing the number of "south" states, developing nations strove to direct the multilateral system to satisfy their pressing economic and social demands. Issues of development enriched the UN agenda while the Security Council remained basically hobbled by the Cold War until the global thaw of the early 90'. With the Cold War gone, North-South confrontation took other directions, particularly when dictatorships, authoritarian or "illiberal" regimes erected an increasingly concerted resistance to the advance of the Human Rights agenda, essaying a "balancing" act that openly or surreptitiously set economic, social and cultural rights above "western" liberties. Holistic visions of security, inspiring a "multidimensional" approach incorporating the demands of the human security paradigm (rather than classical collective security) were accosted as "securitisation" or even new attempts at colonisation 93 .
The 2005 World Summit provided a sound -conceptual and operational- solution stating the interlinked (interdisciplinary) nature of multilateral grand strategy: development cannot be attained unless peace and security prevail, and these are possible only in an environment enabling and securing human dignity. In this respect, the recognition of the Human Security paradigm in its Outcome --albeit in a very watered-down formulation-- provides a global vision centred in human beings and their dignity: 143. We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, [are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want]{.underline}, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential 94 .
The reference to freedom from fear and freedom from want , in particular, preserves a people's centred mission for the United Nations. These concepts were the rationale pillars of the seminal Kofi Annan's "millennium report" titled "We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century", presented to the UN's Millennium Assembly in 2000 (document A/54/2000) 95 . The conceptual thread continued with the Secretary General's report "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (document A/59/2005), that launched the reform process adopted by the 2005 World Summit. While realist-school devotees understand the UN peace and security pillar in mainly geopolitical, state (or rather big power) interest and terms, human security directs it to "the peoples", who suffer the consequences of aggression, terrorism and conflict.
This exordium serves to illuminate from a historical perspective the New Agenda for Peace holistic, multidisciplinary and people centred approach, boldly stated in its Introduction: Building this new multilateralism must start with action for peace, [not only because war undermines progress across all our other agendas]{.underline}, (...) It must also rise to address [myriad global threats that have locked States into interdependence, whether they desire so or not.]{.underline} This new multilateralism demands that we look beyond our narrow security interests. [The peace that we envisage can be pursued only alongside sustainable development and human rights]{.underline} 96 . (Our underlining. While the NAP does not refer to the older, cited instruments, its conception is clearly anchored in the enlarged understanding of peace). Later, defining this vision of multilateralism, the document elaborates further on its peopled-centred vocation:
For national action to sustain peace to be effective, [it must be people-centred, with the full spectrum of human rights at its core]{.underline}. Governments must restore trust with their constituents by [engaging with, protecting and helping realize the aspirations of the people that they represent.]{.underline} The United Nations must follow suit. Civil society actors, [including women human rights defenders and women peacebuilders]{.underline}, play a crucial role in building trust in societies, by representing the most vulnerable or marginalized and those often unrepresented in political structures. Displaced people often face compounded levels of vulnerability, and addressing their needs requires political solutions and political will. (Page 12, our underlining).
The New Agenda for Peace is structured around a) a sombre -but not defeatist- diagnosis of the current global situation; b) a definition of principles for the collective security system (trust, solidarity, universality); c) a vision for multilateralism in a world in transition, addressing the normative dimension of the UN, the value of the means for the peaceful solution of conflict (contained in Chapter VI of the Charter), preventive diplomacy, the role of regional organizations aiming at a "networked-multilateralism", member-state ownership processes, several current global social trends and an effective and impartial Secretariat; finally, d) a substantive set of -seventy- recommendations for action. The 70 recommendations are clustered in twelve actions, presented in five policy rubrics. These are: Prevention at the global level: addressing strategic risks and geopolitical division; Preventing conflict and violence and sustaining peace; Strengthening peace operations and addressing peace enforcement; novel approaches to peace and potential domains of conflict; and Strengthening international governance 97 . We have no space here to delve in detail in a very rich and lucid text, but we strongly recommend its study to all serious international security students and practitioners.
Among the principles spotlighted by the New Agenda for Peace, trust is really foundational for international security. In the NAP's formulation (page 8): Trust is the cornerstone of the collective security system (in fact, of any security system, including one founded upon human security). In its absence, States fall back to their basic instinct to ensure their own security, which, when reciprocated, creates more insecurity for all. This is in fact another way to portray the security dilemma, which sets off after unilateral attempts at ensuring the upper hand which, in turn, provoke a concurrent reaction in neighbours or global rivals.
All arms races stem from the lack of trust and geopolitical competition, and there is no doubt the world is now witnessing not just a renewed nuclear weapons/delivery systems race, but a conventional arms race extending to new theatres, such as outer space and cyber space, and involving new technologies which already defy a genuine application of International Humanitarian Law. The Secretary General states (page 8) that collective security is negatively affected by the neglect of trust, solidarity and universality, indicating that multilateral action for peace has to be grounded on these principles, taken together and carried forward by all States, [and within states]{.underline}.
Such action opens significant opportunities for middle and small powers from the North and the South acting in like-minded frameworks to restore the tissue of understanding and cooperation. As a global public good, international security is indivisible and every State has a measure of power, whether hard, soft or smart, to contribute to the common endeavour of regenerating an environment of cooperation, conducive to peace.
Nuclear disarmament. Action 1 of the New Agenda for Peace posits the elimination of nuclear weapons: Member States must urgently reinforce the barrier against the use of nuclear weapons (...) the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity must motivate us to work towards their total elimination. The NAP naturally feeds on the Secretary General's 2018 Agenda for Disarmament (which we considered in our previous article, specifically when dealing with the paradigm of General and Complete Disarmament 98 ). The NAP's rationale bears a striking resemblance with ideas and preventions posited by States parties and signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in their Vienna Declaration 99 .
The recommendations proposed to implement NAP Action 1 cover the main --and more pressing-- questions involved in nuclear disarmament. We transcribe them with alongside comments in blue:
The New Agenda for Peace does not contain a direct reference (or elaboration) to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, but the recommendations and the Vienna Declaration are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, parties and signatories of the TPNW ought to be in the first line of diplomatic action to advance the NAP.
But the advancement of the New Agenda for Peace or, for that matter, any consequential multilateral effort towards a world without nuclear weapons will necessitate a serious reform of the governance mechanisms for international security.
The indispensable reform of the disarmament machinery. Action 12 in the New Agenda for Peace seeks to build a stronger collective security machinery. Its scope is wide, encompassing main organs and subsidiary bodies with responsibilities for the preservation of international peace and security: the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Peacebuilding Commission (created by the World Summit in 2005). Of these we shall concentrate on the revitalisation of the General Assembly, the legal and political venue most apt to operate the envisaged change in the disarmament machinery.
The NAP recognises that some disarmament institutions have been deadlocked [for more than two decades]{.underline}, hindering the ability of Member States to manage threats in traditional as well as new domains. Therefore, [urgent action]{.underline} to revitalize these institutions is needed.
The General Assembly has a critical role to play, based on its strong legitimacy and universal membership, to address a range of peace and security challenges and exercise its powers under Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter. [This role can be particularly important when the Security Council is unable to fulfil its primary responsibility]{.underline} for the maintenance of international peace and security. Recommendations (related to the disarmament machinery) 101 • The General Assembly should exercise its primary role for substantive deliberations in the field of disarmament, in accordance with its rules of procedure and practice. The General Assembly should also agree on standards [for the participation of other stakeholders in the work of its subsidiary organs in the field of disarmament]{.underline}. (This entails opening disarmament bodies to the participation of civil society and academia according to current multilateral practice [such as in the TPNW]. The disarmament machinery is the less NGO-friendly segment in global governance).• Reform the disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, in order to optimize their respective roles, including to build consensus progressively on evolving disarmament priorities and review and make recommendations on developments in science and technology and their potential impact on disarmament and international security. (If taken seriously, this recommendation ought to be materialised through normative action taken by the General Assembly. The Conference on Disarmament is the institution deadlocked for more than two decades. Its rules of procedure -consensus conceived as the equivalent of veto by any member State- preclude change from within).• Establish an intergovernmental process to discuss how to achieve the above goals and consider the role, timing and preparations [of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.]{.underline} (This is the most powerful recommendation in this section of the NAP, as we will procure to demonstrate in the following section).
The first General Assembly Special Session devoted to Disarmament, 1978 (SSOD-I). Forty-five years have elapsed since the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament 102 . Acclaimed as a diplomatic success, convening a substantial participation of world leaders and senior diplomats, setting political standards which remain valid and pertinent today, SSOD-I took place at a turbulent historical juncture, governed by the tidal forces of the Cold War, and in the midst of an unrelenting arms race which had pushed the numbers of nuclear warheads to more than 50.000, enough to erase life on the planet several times 103 .
Some current analysis, centring on great power competition and the re-emergence of cold war, points to the enhanced weight of the so-called "global south", reluctant to take sides and more interested in global cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. It seems useful, therefore, to recall that the SSOD-I was a political product of the Non-Aligned Movement, alarmed not just by the prospect of nuclear annihilation but discomfited by the immense resources devoured by the arms race, depriving developing states of means for economic growth and social advancement.
The political initiative, motioned by the Non-Aligned movement, was facilitated by able diplomats, who mustered the patience and professional dexterity to build consensus. And it was a Latin-American, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas from Argentina, who conducted the 54-member Preparatory Committee with elegance and determination, providing the plenary with a draft which -in spite of containing a "forest of brackets" 104 - served as a useful basis for negotiation.
The First Special Session's Final Document. This seminal instrument, adopted four decades ago under political circumstances no less complex than the current juncture, embodies a solid consensus, formulated through statements, reflexions and principles with the cogency of lasting pillars 105 .
Paragraph 1, read against the background of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, remains utterly pertinent: States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence 106 . Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. These words, adopted by consensus and thus carrying full politically binding authority, retain their sombre impact today, when the spectre of nuclear weapons use has been awakened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
An outcome of profound significance from SSOD-I is its understanding of peace and security as a global public good 107 . In other words, a conception of security resting not upon the accumulation of weapons -the offspring of the security dilemma- but on cooperation: The time has therefore come (...) to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. (...) To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.
It is a fact that --even before the Ukrainian war 108 -- the nuclear arms race had reignited, not yet with the frenzy displayed in the '70 and the '80, but with all the technological impetus of the fourth industrial revolution. Add to that the explosion in military expenditure triggered by the Russian aggression (US$ 2,24 trillion in 2022). Thus, in order to allocate the vast resources demanded by climate change mitigation and adaptation, it is imperative to reclaim the broad concept of peace enshrined in the UN Charter and permeating the final document of SSOD-I. Such notion leads to the paradigm of Human Security, a conception of security giving primacy to human beings, incompatible with the very existence of weapons capable to efface life from the surface of our planet.
This is the powerful message of paragraph 13, containing a vision of disarmament: *Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.*
Furthermore, the SSOD-I Outcome document contains an unequivocal reaffirmation of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), as a fundamental component of such vision 109 .
The 2018 UN Agenda for Disarmament, states that "General and complete disarmament", a term coined nearly a century ago, remains the ultimate objective of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It is now critical for the international community to reconceptualize this fundamental goal so that disarmament actions, making use of all the measures available in the toolbox, clearly contribute to human, national and collective security in the 21st Century 110 . Now, General and Complete Disarmament is not a utopic goal to supress all militaries, but an imperfect -and thus badly misinterpreted- formulation to convey the idea of achieving , progressively, a state of * undiminished security for all, at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces* 111 . The principle of "undiminished security for all" is indeed another major outcome of SSOD-I, frequently invoked in disarmament debates 112 .
Properly understood, all states have incentives to promote GCD as a universal security paradigm but, especially, nations from the South, disproportionally affected by global scourges such as climate change, pandemics, famine and mass displacement requiring massive financial remedies. And it is in this context that the Outcome document asserts the close relationship between disarmament and development 113 .
Another key contribution from SSOD-I is the principle that all States are entitled to advance the disarmament agenda . This notion of inclusiveness 114 runs contrary to the subjacent, prevalent idea that disarmament is a big power domain. True, Article VI of the NPT had established that all states parties have a measure of responsibility in achieving nuclear disarmament, but the Final Document is explicit: *28. All peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.* (Note a quasi-crescendo: "vital interest", "the duty", "the right", "equal footing").
The reform of the disarmament machinery and the need for a Fourth Special Session devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV)
Apart from its enduring political validity, SSOD-I remains the institutional foundation for the disarmament machinery . This is the machinery which the Secretary General endeavours to reform in Action 12 of the New Agenda for Peace, including through a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament .
Bodies in the disarmament machinery adopt decisions by consensus 115 . Its justification is the alleged need to ensure the engagement of all major/relevant States in treaties, instruments, and decisions dealing with international security which, by their nature, affect the vital interests of big powers. The consensus rule is interpreted in the most restrictive way: for example, any one of the current 65 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) can block a decision (although in reality this veto right of sorts is exercised only by large powers). A narrow view of national interests has led to the abuse of the rule of consensus; and consequently, the CD has remained deadlocked for twenty-five years, unable even to adopt a programme of work.
Consensus, which should remain as a desired outcome in every multilateral initiative, and the rule of consensus are very different things. It was the abuse of the rule of consensus and the lack of progress in the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations --united to a deeper moral awareness about the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament-- that prompted a majority of UN members to circumvent the Conference of Disarmament and locate the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons directly in the General Assembly. So, first with the Ottawa and the Oslo Conventions (banning antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions) and later with the TPNW the majority of UN member States have somehow defanged the "consensus taboo" hobbling disarmament.
A fourth General Assembly Special Session devoted to Disarmament should address the procedural (and other) obstacles hindering the machinery first, by reasserting the General Assembly's institutional authority in disarmament matters 116 .
The General Assembly is the only universal body endowed with both the legal mandate (Article 11 of the UN Charter 117 ) and the political legitimacy to adopt and sustain a normative framework for "undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments..." One of the crucial recommendations in the New Agenda for Peace is therefore the initiation of the process leading to SSOD-IV. The present exacerbation of geopolitical tension and armed conflict makes this goal not just necessary but urgent.
As pointed out by Dr. Randy Rydell 118 , an SSOD is about bringing democracy to disarmament . I would add that it is also about empowering majorities in the international community to balance power politics. And this is enhanced by the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, allowing for voting (requiring sometimes two third majorities) 119 : without the democratic possibility of asserting the rights of a solid majority, the TPNW would not exist.
Moreover, an SSOD-IV would create spaces for debate, dialogue, awareness raising and understanding. Also, as a live learning exercise, it would help new generations of "disarmists" to connect with the past, to understand better the United Nations potential and to illuminate old problems with the cognitive and political insights developed, for instance, by climate change and gender diplomacy.
Multilateral diplomacy is all about process, and process needs to be sustained along decades, including through "festivals" such as a special session of the General Assembly, charged with philosophical, political, legal and liturgical questions and challenges.
During the consultations organised by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs to prepare the launching of the New Agenda for Peace the notion of a "new vision for disarmament" was discussed. My position on the matter was that the Outcome document of SSOD-I contains the conceptual and legal foundations of the United Nations vision on disarmament. Such vision, framed in the rich and expansive language of its day, has been complemented by documents such as the Agenda for Disarmament and the New Agenda for Peace, incorporating the peculiar challenges of our times, among them new and disruptive technologies, amidst continuous social evolution.
We need a Special Session on Disarmament for this pressing and troubled hour, riding on the General Assembly as the democratic vehicle through which "we, the peoples" can manifest our genuine vocation for peace and cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS
At a time when the international landscape turns increasingly gloomy -events in Gaza igniting again the ever-unstable Middle East cauldron- peace loving members of the international community need to act to restore communication, leading to renewed diplomatic dialogue and eventually, bilateral and multilateral negotiation.
Middle and small powers have important political resources to mobilise, including their civil societies, to nudge and even pester big powers into communication. Ultimately, diplomacy may restore the levels of trust needed for peaceful coexistence: a new détente is possible. The multilateral system needs support and engagement from all stakeholders in international security, not just States.
The multilateral system is a shared, common resource we need to uphold and stir. As the Secretary General proclaims in his New Agenda for Peace a majority of States remain deeply invested in the multilateral system as essential to secure their sovereignty and independence, [as well as to moderate the behaviour of major powers]{.underline} 120 . (Our underlining).
The "interlocking" threats defying humanity and the interdependence which bind us all, big and small, must serve as incentives and drivers for cooperation. And we have venues and instruments serving as rallying points and platforms for action: in particular, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons stands out as -mainly- a political construct serving the security interests of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, whose survival is threatened by the mere existence of atomic bombs.
International law is on the side of our majority. It sustains the paradigms of humanitarian disarmament and ultimately, human security.
Countries from the "global South", through their many multilateral compacts and partnerships (such us the Non-Aligned movement and the G-77, but also via flexible, cross-cutting configurations) have real capacities to defend multilateralism and engage in several, overlapping initiatives and campaigns aimed at overcoming global threats and challenges. In particular, we have a deep interest in advancing the NAP, among other reasons, to forestall the appalling increase in military expenditures, deviating resources needed to mitigate the slow brewing climate change catastrophe.
Chile has always played a creative, consensus-building role in multilateral arenas: our diplomacy ought to be found in the front multilateral lines. This requires working with all multilateral actors and stakeholders, from "the North" and "the South" and, especially, with the vibrant nuclear disarmament civil society community.
Consequently, our diplomacy needs to elevate nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security to the levels of priority required by the current, dangerous juncture. The following actions would serve that purpose: